A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multiunit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of (potentially many di¤erent) goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously …xed number of units. We de…ne a competitive equilibrium for this generalized assignment game and prove its existence by using only linear programming. In particular, we show how to compute equilibrium price We thank Ester Camiña, John Hat…eld, and Alejandro Manelli for their very helpful comments. The work of D. Jaume and A.
Introduction
We study competitive equilibria of markets with indivisible goods. The multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands (a market) is a manyto-many assignment problem with transferable utility in which agents can be partitioned into two disjoint sets: the set of buyers and the set of sellers. In this market sellers deliver indivisible units of (potentially di¤erent) goods to buyers who pay a given amount of money for every unit of each good. Each seller owns a given number of indivisible units of each good and each buyer may buy di¤erent units of the goods up to an exogenously …xed number which comes from constraints on his capacity for transport, storage, etc. Each seller assigns a per-unit value (or reservation price) to each of the di¤erent goods that he owns. Each buyer assigns a valuation (or maximal willingness to pay) to each unit of the di¤erent goods; this means that his marginal utility of each of the goods is constant.
There are many assignment problems with these characteristics. 1 They are many-tomany because each agent can be assigned to (i.e., perform a transaction with) many agents of the other side of the market. They have transferable utility because money may be used as a means of exchange. They are heterogeneous sales because a unit of a particular good owned by a seller may be di¤erent from a unit of another good owned by the same seller. They are multi-demanded because buyers may be willing to buy several units of di¤erent goods. The main questions to be answered are the following. Given an initial distribution of units of the goods among all sellers, (i) what is their optimal assignment to buyers? (ii) what are the prices (if any) that would clear the market?, (iii) what is the subset of goods that are indeed exchanged?, and (iv) what is the set of (overall) utilities that agents might receive?
Given a market, an assignment is a description of how many units of each of the goods are exchanged between every pair formed by a buyer and a seller. An assignment is feasible if it satis…es the quantity and capacity constraints of all agents. A feasible assignment is optimal if it maximizes the total net value (the sum of the valuations minus the reserve price of all exchanged units). It turns out that the set of optimal assignments of a market can be identi…ed with the set of integer solutions of a natural Primal Linear Problem where the objective function (to be maximized) is the total net value, which depends linearly on the assignment, subject to non-negativity constraints and to feasibility constraints. Results on integer programming (see Schrijver, 1996) guarantee that the Primal Linear Program has at least one solution with integer components, since the set of all real-valued solutions of the Primal Linear Program is a polytope whose vertices have all integer-valued coordinates.
To choose an optimal assignment requires information about valuations, reservation prices, and quantity and capacity constraints. Hence, competitive markets may emerge (or be used) as a way of selecting an optimal assignment with low informational requirements. We will assume that buyers and sellers exchange units of the goods with money through competitive markets in which a price vector (a non-negative price for each good) is announced. Given the price vector, each seller determines the optimal number of units he wants to sell of each of the goods he owns and each buyer determines the optimal number of units he wants to buy of each good, without exceeding his capacity constraints. A price vector p is an equilibrium price vector of the market if the plans of all sellers and buyers are compatible at p; namely, the market of each good clears in the sense that all optimal plans constitute a feasible and compatible set of exchanges (they are a feasible assignment). In this case we say that the equilibrium price vector and the feasible assignment are compatible. A competitive equilibrium of the market is a pair formed by an equilibrium price vector and a compatible assignment. We show using well-known duality theorems of linear programming that each market has at least a competitive equilibrium. 2 All our proofs rely only on well-know results of linear programming. First, we observe that the Dual Linear Problem associated to the Primal Linear Program has a non-empty set of solutions; second, we give a procedure to construct an equilibrium price vector from a given solution of the Dual Linear Program; and third, we show that any optimal solution of the Primal Linear Program is compatible with this equilibrium price vector. Thus, the set of competitive equilibria of a market is intimately related to the set of solutions of the Primal Linear Program (compatible optimal assignments) and the Dual Linear Program (equilibrium price vectors). 3 We next show that the set of competitive equilibria of a market has a Cartesian product structure: each equilibrium price vector is compatible with all optimal assignments and each optimal assignment is compatible with all equilibrium price vectors. Moreover, the set of equilibrium price vectors has a lattice structure with the natural order of vectors (a re ‡exive, transitive, antisymmetric, and incomplete binary relation) on the n dimensional Euclidian space, where n is the number of goods and given two vectors x; y 2 R n , x y if and only if x j y j for all j = 1; :::; n. As a consequence of this lattice structure, the set of equilibrium price vectors contains two extreme elements: the sellers-optimal equilibrium price vector with each component being larger or equal to the corresponding component of all other equilibrium price vectors and the buyers-optimal equilibrium price vector with each component being smaller or equal to the corresponding component of all other equilibrium price vectors. We observe that, in contrast to the Shapley and Shubik (1972)'s assignment game, this natural order does not translate into the set of utilities of buyers (nor the set of utilities of sellers) that can be attainable at equilibrium. Partly, this is because there is a insubstantial multiplicity of equilibrium prices of the goods that are not interchanged in any equilibrium assignment. We solve this multiplicity by de…ning the set of restricted equilibrium price vectors as those equilibrium price vectors for which the price of the goods that are never interchanged in equilibrium is equal to their maximal one without altering the equilibrium property of the full price vector. We show that the set of restricted equilibrium price vectors has a complete lattice structure with the natural order of vectors . Then, we show that the set of utilities of buyers that are attainable at equilibrium embeds the lattice structure of the set of restricted equilibrium price vectors. However, we also show that the set of utilities of the sellers that are attainable at equilibrium does not inherit this 3 Shapley and Shubik (1972) already pointed out the relationships among the set of competitive equilibria of a one-to-one assignment game, the core of its associated TU-game, and the solutions of the corresponding primal and dual linear problems.
structure.
There are several papers that have studied generalized versions of Shapley and Shubik (1972)'s one-to-one assignment game to many-to-one or many-to-many models. Camiña (2006) , Sotomayor (1999 Sotomayor ( , 2002 Sotomayor ( , 2003 Sotomayor ( , 2007 Sotomayor ( , and 2009 ) and Milgrom (2009) are some of them. However, part of the emphasis of this literature has been put on the study of alternative cooperative solutions of the associated TU-game, although Camiña (2006) , Sotomayor (2007 and ) and Milgrom (2009) also study the competitive equilibria of their generalized assignment games. At the end of Section 2 and in Subsection 5.1 we describe this very related literature as well as its connections with our model and results.
Our main contribution to this literature is partially methodological because all our results are proved exclusively through the following well-known linear programming results: the primal and dual linear programs have solutions (integer-valued for the case of the primal), the strong duality theorem and the complementary slackness theorem. Beside of giving an uni…ed treatment this approach has an important computational advantage since there exist several algorithms to compute solutions of linear programs and hence, they can be used to compute competitive equilibria and their associated vectors of agents'utilities. Most of the results in related models extending Shapley and Shubik (1972)'s assignment game use in their proofs existential (and hence, non-computable) arguments. For instance, in Sotomayor (2007) the existence of equilibrium price vectors and its lattice structure (as well as the dual lattice structure of the sets of equilibrium agents' utilities) are obtained by applying Tarski (1955)'s …xed point theorem. Milgrom (2009) proves that the set of equilibrium price vectors has a lattice structure by applying Topkis (1978)'s …xed point theorem.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we de…ne the multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands (a market) and compare our model with existing related models in the literature. In Section 3, we de…ne optimal assignments and the associated Primal Linear Program of a market. In Section 4 we present the notion of a competitive equilibrium and show its existence by using duality theorems of Linear Programming. In Section 5 we study the structure of the set of competitive equilibria by showing that it is a Cartesian product of the set of equilibrium price vectors times the set of optimal assignments, and that the set of restricted equilibrium price vectors has a complete lattice structure with the natural partial order ; we also show how this partial order endows a lattice structure to the set of utilities of the buyers (but not to the set of utilities of the sellers) that are attainable at equilibrium. In Section 6 we conclude with some …nal remarks. Appendix 1 at the end of the paper collects omitted proofs. Appendices 2 and 3 at the end of the paper contain some technical and omitted material.
Preliminaries and Related Models
The multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands (a market) consists of seven objects. The …rst three are three …nite and disjoint sets. The set of m buyers B = fb 1 ; :::; b m g, the set of n type of goods G = fg 1 ; :::; g n g, and the set of t sellers S = fs 1 ; :::; s t g. We identify buyer b i with i, good g j with j, and seller s k with k.
For each buyer i 2 B and each good j 2 G, let v ij 0 be the monetary valuation that buyer i assigns to each unit of good j; namely, v ij is the maximum price that buyer i is willing to pay for each unit of good j: We denote by V = (v ij ) (i;j)2B G the matrix of valuations. Each buyer i 2 B can buy at most d i > 0 units in total. We are assuming that buyers have a constant marginal valuation of each unit of each good and that they are constrained on their total demand. The amount d i should be interpreted as a capacity constraint of buyer i due to limits on his ability for transport, storage, etc. We denote by d = (d i ) i2B the vector of maximal demands.
For each good j 2 G and each seller k 2 S, let r jk 0 be the monetary valuation that seller k assigns to each unit of good j; namely, r jk is the reservation (or minimum) price that seller k is willing to accept for each unit of good j. We denote by R = (r jk ) (j;k)2G S the matrix of reservation prices. Each seller k 2 S has a given number q jk 2 Z + of indivisible units of each good j 2 G, where Z + is the set of non-negative integers. We denote by Q = (q jk ) (j;k)2G S the capacity matrix. Observe that we are admitting the possibility that seller k may have zero units of some of the goods. However, we require that the reservation price for buyer k of a good that he has no units to sell has to be equal to zero; namely, for all k 2 S and all j 2 G, if q jk = 0 then r jk = 0:
Moreover, we assume that there is a strictly amount of each good; namely, for each j 2 G there exists k 2 S such that q jk > 0:
A market M is a 7-tuple (B; G; S; V; d; R; Q) satisfying (1) and (2) . This constitutes a many-to-many generalization of Shapley and Shubik (1972)'s (one-to-one) assignment game in which each buyer only wants to buy at most one unit (i.e., d i = 1 for all i 2 B), there is only one unit of each good and the set of goods and sellers can be uniquely identi…ed with each other because each seller only owns the unique available unit of a good (i.e., n = t and for all (j; k) 2 G S, q jk = 1 if j = k and q jk = 0 if j 6 = k). There are other papers that have already extended Shapley and Shubik (1972) model. Camiña (2006) studies an instance of our model in which there is a unique seller that owns n di¤erent indivisible objects and each buyer wants to buy at most one object (i.e., t = 1, q j1 = 1 for all j = 1; :::; n, and d i = 1 for all i 2 B). Sotomayor (2007) studies another extension of the assignment game in which buyers may want to buy several goods although they are not interested in acquiring more than one unit from a given seller, and each seller owns a number of identical and indivisible objects; thus, we can also identify uniquely goods with sellers (i.e., n = t, d i 2 Z + nf0g for all i 2 B, q jk 2 Z + nf0g if j = k and q jk = 0 if j 6 = k, and each buyer i and each seller k can exchange at most one unit of the good j = k owned by the seller). 4 To illustrate why our model is not a particular instance of the models studied by Camiña Observe that (i) there are two sellers and buyers 1 and 2 may buy up to 25 and 15 units respectively, and (ii) there are more goods than sellers and each seller owns several units of the three goods. Thus, by (i) and (ii) our results can not follow from either results in Camiña (2006) or Sotomayor (2007) , respectively. Milgrom (2009) introduces and studies the space of assignment messages to investigate (and solve) the di¢ culty that agents face, in some mechanism design settings, when reporting their "types"(or valuations of goods, or sets of goods). The model is very general and contains as particular cases multi-unit auctions (with substitutable goods), exchange economies, and integer assignment games. The last one generalizes the Shapley and Shubik (1972)'s model in many ways; in particular, agents (i) may buy some good and sell others (there are no a priori sets of buyers and sellers) and (ii) may trade many units of each good, instead of just one unit. For our model, which is a particular instance of Milgrom (2009), we obtain additional results; for instance, that the set of competitive equilibria is the Cartesian product of the set of equilibrium price vectors and optimal assignments and that the sets of agents'utilities that are attainable at equilibrium partly inherit the lattice structure of the set of equilibrium price vectors.
Optimal Assignments
In this section we de…ne optimal assignments of a market and show using Linear Programming that they do exist.
An assignment for market M is a matrix A = (A ijk ) (i;j;k)2B G S 2 Z m n t + . Given an assignment A; each A ijk should be interpreted as follows: buyer i receives A ijk units of good j from seller k. When no confusion can arise, we omit the sets to which the subscripts belong to and write, for instance, P ijk A ijk and
We are only interested on assignments satisfying all demand and supply restrictions of feasibility.
De…nition 1
The assignment A is feasible for market M if the following two sets of inequalities hold:
(Demand Feasibility) For all i 2 B, P jk A ijk d i : (Supply Feasibility) For all (j; k) 2 G S, P i A ijk q jk : The inequality in (Demand Feasibility) says that each buyer i buys, in total, at most d i units of all goods while the inequality in (Supply Feasibility) says that each seller k sells at most q jk units of each good j. We denote by F the set of all feasible assignments of market M .
For each (i; j; k) 2 B G S; let
be the per unit gain from the trade of good j between buyer i and seller k; observe that if seller k does not have any unit of good j the per unit gain from trade of good j with all buyers is equal to zero and that ijk is negative if v ij < r jk . Let M be a market and A 2 F be a feasible assignment. We de…ne the total gain from trade of market M at assignment A as T (A) = P ijk ijk A ijk :
We denote by F the set of all optimal assignments for market M . In order to …nd the set of optimal assignments for market M = (B; S; G; V; d; R; Q) we consider the following Primal Linear Program (PLP).
Primal linear Program (PLP)
:
Results in linear programming guarantee that the set of (real-valued) solutions of the (PLP) is non-empty. Moreover, results in integer programming guarantee that at least one of these solutions has integer components (see Schrijver, 1996) ; namely, F 6 = ;. Appendix 2 at the end of the paper contains a brief description of why the (PLP) has an integer solution. Thus, we state without proof the following result.
Proposition 1 Every market M has a nonempty set of optimal assignments.
Competitive Equilibria

De…nition and Existence
We consider the situation where buyers and sellers trade through competitive markets. That is, there is a unique market (and its corresponding unique price) for each of the goods. Hence, a price vector is an n dimensional vector of non-negative real numbers. Buyers and sellers are price-takers: given a price vector p = (p j ) j2G 2 R n + sellers supply units of the goods (up to their capacity) in order to maximize revenues at p and buyers demand units of the goods (up to their maximal demands) in order to maximize the total net valuation at p.
Supply of seller k For each price vector p = (p j ) j2G 2 R n + , seller k supplies of every good j any feasible amount that maximizes revenues; namely,
To de…ne the demands of buyers we need the following notation. Let p 2 R n + be given and consider buyer i. Let
be the set of goods that give to buyer i the maximum (and strictly positive) net valuation at p. Obviously, for some p; the set r > i (p) may be empty. Let
be the set of goods that give to buyer i the maximum (and non-negative) net valuation at p. Obviously, for some p; the set r i (p) may also be empty. Moreover, it is immediate to see that, for all i 2 B and all p 2 R n + ,
Demand of buyer i For each price vector p = (p j ) j2G 2 R n + buyer i demands any feasible amounts of the goods that maximize the net valuations at p; namely,
describes the set of all trades that maximize the net valuation of buyer i at p: Observe that the set of trades described by each element in the set D i (p) give the same net valuation to buyer i; i.e., i is indi¤erent among all trade plans speci…ed by each
Let A be an assignment and let i be a buyer. We denote by
(E.S) For each good j 2 G and each seller k 2 S;
We say that a price vector p and a feasible assignment
Let P be the set of equilibrium price vectors of market M: Theorem 1 below states that the set P is always non-empty.
Theorem 1 For every market M; P 6 = ;:
Milgrom (2009) proves Theorem 1 for a more general model by showing that equilibrium price vectors are the optimal solutions of a non-linear and continuous function of p restricted to a compact set. 5 However, in Appendix 1 at the end of the paper we include our proof because it only uses linear programming arguments and it is based on computing an optimal assignment (as one of the integer solutions of the Primal Liner Program (PLP)) and a particular equilibrium price vector in P associated to one of the solutions of the Dual Linear Program (DLP) that we present below.
The Dual Linear Program
In this subsection we present the Dual Linear Program (DLP) and state two well-known results of linear programming: the Strong Duality Theorem and the Complementary Slackness Theorem. Using these two theorems we will show in Theorem 2 that there exists a strong link between the set of competitive equilibria and the set of solutions of the (PLP) and the (DLP).
Let M = (B; S; G; V; d; R; Q) be a market. Let = ( i ) i2B 2 R m be an m dimensional vector and = ( jk ) (j;k)2G S 2 R n t be a (n t) matrix (below we give an interpretation of these two objects).
Dual Linear Program (DLP):
for all (j; k) 2 G S:
Let D be the set of dual feasible solutions (i.e., the set of vectors 2 R m and matrices 2 R n t that satisfy conditions (D.1), (D.2), and (D.3)), and let D be the set of solutions of the (DLP). Results in linear programming guarantee that the (DLP) has at least a solution (see Schrijver, 1996) ; namely, D 6 = ;. Moreover, D is a convex subset of R m R n t . Thus, we state the following result. A dual solution ( ; ) 2 D can be interpreted as a way of sharing the gains of trade among buyers and sellers associated to a particular competitive equilibrium (p; A). The i th component of vector describes the (unique) per unit gain of buyer i of all units that he buys and the (j; k) th element of matrix describes the (unique) per unit gain of seller k of good j. For instance, assume that ( ; ) 2 D and (p; A) is a competitive equilibrium with A ijk > 0; i.e., buyer i buys at least one unit of good j to seller k. Then, as we will formally show later, i = v ij p j and jk = p j r jk : Thus, we can identify (almost uniquely) each dual solution with an equilibrium price, and vice versa. As we will see, this identi…cation is not unique. A …rst (but insubstantial) reason of why this identi…cation is not unique is as follows. Let ( ; ) 2 D and assume that q jk = 0 for some (j; k) 2 G S. Let 0 jk 0 be arbitrary. De…ne ( jk ; 0 jk ) as the (n t) matrix obtained from after replacing jk by 0 jk : Then, ( ; ( jk ; 0 jk )) 2 D ; that is, the value of the (j; k) th entry of is irrelevant. Hence, we assume without loss of generality that jk = 0 whenever q jk = 0:
Under this convention, the following result holds.
Let M be a market and ( ; ) 2 D be a dual feasible solution. We write T d ( ; ) to denote the value of the objective function of the (DLP) at ( ; ); that is,
The Strong Duality Theorem of Linear Programming (see Dantzig, 1963) applied to our setting says that the values of the objective functions of the two linear problems at any pair of solutions coincide; and viceversa, if at a feasible assignment and at a feasible dual the two objective functions coincide then they are solutions of their respective linear problems. Formally, Strong Duality Theorem Let M be a market and assume A 2 F and ( ; ) 2 D. Then,
The Complementary Slackness Theorem of Linear Programming (see Schrijver, 1996 ) says that if a restriction is not binding then the corresponding variable has to be equal to zero and if a variable is not equal to zero then its corresponding restriction has to be binding. Hence, applied to our setting the Complementary Slackness Theorem says the following.
Complementary Slackness Theorem Let M be a market. Then, for all A 2 F and ( ; ) 2 D , the following properties hold:
Competitive Equilibria and Solutions of the Linear Programs
Theorem 2 below says that the set of competitive equilibria (pairs of equilibrium price vectors and compatible assignments) is strongly related to the set of solutions of the two Linear Programs. In order to state and prove it, we need to relate price vectors with dual solutions. De…ne the mappings ( ) :
and for each (j; k) 2 G S, de…ne
The number i (p) is the gain obtained by buyer i from each unit that he wants to buy at p (if any) and the number jk (p) is the pro…t obtained by seller k from each unit of good j that he wants to sell at p (if any).
Theorem 2 Let M be a market and let p 2 R n + be a price vector. The following two statements hold. Proof See Appendix 1 at the end of the paper.
Corollary 1
The set of equilibrium price vectors P is a convex and compact subset of R n + .
5 Structure of the Set of Competitive Equilibria
Previous results
Recall that the assignment game of Shapley and Shubik (1972) is a particular instance of our model where each seller owns one indivisible object and each buyer wants to buy at most one object. Since objects owned by di¤erent sellers may be perceived di¤erently by di¤erent buyers (or they may, indeed, be di¤erent), we can identify the set of goods G with the set of sellers S. Namely, a market M is an assignment game if d i = 1 for all i 2 B; n = t and for all (j; k) 2 G S,
Hence, each seller j 2 S has a reservation value r j 0 of the indivisible object j 2 G that he owns. Thus, an assignment game can be identi…ed as an (m t) matrix a, where for all (i; j) 2 B S, a ij = maxf0; v ij r j g.
The set of competitive equilibria of a (one-to-one) assignment game has the following four properties.
(1) The set of equilibrium price vectors is a non-empty, convex and compact subset of R n + .
(2) The set of competitive equilibria is the Cartesian product of the set of equilibrium price vectors times the set of optimal assignments.
(3) The set of equilibrium price vectors P endowed with the partial order on R n + (where p p 0 if and only if p j p 0 j for all j 2 G) is a complete lattice. 6 In particular, given p; p 0 2 P ; (maxfp j ; p 0 j g) j2G 2 P and (minfp j ; p 0 j g) j2G 2 P : Moreover, the set of equilibrium price vectors contains two extreme vectors p B and p S with the property that for any equilibrium price vector p 2 P , p S p p B :
(4) The lattice structure of P is translated into the set of utilities that are attainable at equilibrium as follows. Given p 2 P and an optimal assignment = ( ij ) (i;j)2B S , de…ne for each i 2 B,
and for each j 2 S,
It turns out that these utilities are independent of the chosen optimal assignment (see Lemma 6 below for a proof of this statement in our more general many-to-many setting). Thus, we can write them as depending only on the equilibrium price vector p. Then, for all p; p 0 2 P , the following three statements are equivalent:
Hence, we can de…ne two binary relations u and w on P as follows: for p; p 0 2 P ;
and
Then, the set P endowed with the partial order u (or w ) is a complete lattice. Moreover, u and w are dual in the sense that p u p 0 () p 0 w p. Consider again our model. We have already seen (in Theorem 1 and Corollary 1) that property (1) still holds while Milgrom (2009) shows using Topkis (1978)'s theorem that property (3) also holds. In this section we will show that property (2) is satis…ed while property (4) only holds partially. In particular, the equivalences between the statements (a), (b), and (c) above do not hold anymore on P . One of the reasons is because there may be goods that are never exchanged in equilibrium; for instance, because the smallest reserve price r j = min k2S r jk of good j is strictly larger than its largest valuation v j = max i2B v ij .
Then, the price of good j can be equal to any number in the interval [v j ; r j ] without a¤ecting the equilibrium property of the full vector. We shrink the set of equilibrium price vectors by …xing the price of the goods that are never exchanged at equilibrium at the highest possible one that keeps the equilibrium properties of the full price vector. We call it set the set of restricted equilibrium price vectors and denote it by P . Then, we show in Theorem 3 that P has also a complete lattice structure with the natural order of vectors. 7 Moreover, we show that the equivalence of (a) and (b) above holds on P and that property (c) above is not anymore equivalent to properties (a) and (b) on the set P ; i.e., for all p; p 0 2 P ; Before proceeding we compare these results with similar results obtained in related models. Camiña (2006) shows that in her model with one seller and unit-demands the set of core utilities has the following properties: (i) it is non-empty, (ii) it may not coincide with the set of utilities that are attainable at equilibrium, and (iii) it forms a complete lattice. In Sotomayor (2007)'s model where there are the same number of goods and sellers, each seller only owns (potentially many) units of one good and exchanges are binary (i.e., A ijk 2 f0; 1g for all (i; j; k) 2 B G S) it is showed that the sets of agents' utilities attainable at equilibrium have a dual lattice structure with the partial order on R n . This is inherited from the lattice of the set of equilibrium price vectors because each seller only owns units of one good. Moreover, Sotomayor (2007)'s proof applies Tarski (1955)'s algebraic …xed point theorem to an order-preserving and non-identical map whose …xed points are the set of utilities that are attainable at equilibrium. In contrast, our results are di¤erent and are exclusively based on duality theorems of linear programming. Sotomayor (2009) extends her previous results to a more general model in which any two agents from each side of the market may form a partnership, contribute with an (identical) amount of labor (that may be perfectly divisible) and generate an amount of income which has to be divided among the two of them. Sotomayor (2009) shows the relationships that hold among several solution concepts and their non-emptyness. Finally, Milgrom (2009) does not address properties (2) and (4), and complements property (3) by showing, using Topkis (1978)'s theorem, that in his general setting the set of market-clearing prices is a non-empty, closed, and convex sublattice (a subset of a lattice that is itself a lattice).
The main methodological contribution of our paper is that all our results on the gen- 7 Our proof is direct and it does not use Topkis (1978)'s theorem. In addition, with a few slight mod-i…cations it can be adapted to prove directly that P has a complete lattice structure with the order . eralized many-to-many assignment game are exclusively based on linear programming arguments: (i) the identi…cation of optimal assignments and competitive equilibrium prices with the solutions of the primal and dual linear programs, respectively; and (ii) the Strong Duality and the Complementary Slackness Theorems. As we have already argued in the Introduction, this approach is useful because we can obtain optimal assignments and equilibrium price vectors by means of any of the many existing algorithms that compute solutions of linear programs. 
Cartesian Product
Sets of Equilibrium Utilities
Let p 2 R n + be a price vector and A 2 F a feasible assignment of market M: We de…ne the utility of buyer i 2 B at the pair (p; A) as the total net gain obtained by i from his exchanges speci…ed by A at price p. We denote it by u i (p; A); namely,
We de…ne the utility of seller k 2 S at the pair (p; A) as the total net gain obtained by k from his exchanges speci…ed by A at price p. We denote it by w k (p; A); namely,
as the set of goods that are exchanged at some optimal assignment. For each seller k 2 S, de…ne
as the set of goods of which k sells strictly positive amounts at some optimal assignment. Obviously, G > = [ k2S G > k . Next lemma states that at equilibrium utilities are independent of the particular optimal assignment chosen since they only depend on the equilibrium price vector (which determines the associated solution of the (DLP)).
Lemma 6
Let p 2 P be an equilibrium price vector of M and let A 2 F be an optimal assignment of M . Then, the following two conditions hold:
Proof of Lemma 6 Let (p; A) 2 P F : Note that p and A are compatible. To prove (L6.1), …x i 2 B. By de…nition, u i (p; A) = P jk (v ij p j ) A ijk : Let (j; k) 2 G S be given. If A ijk = 0 then, (v ij p j ) A ijk can trivially be written as i (p) A ijk : If A ijk 6 = 0 then, by condition (D.d) in the de…nition of D i (p); j 2 r i (p); which implies that (v ij p j ) = i (p); and u i (p; A) = i (p) ( P jk A ijk ): If i (p) = 0 then, the statement holds because i (p) ( P jk A ijk ) = i (p) d i = 0: By condition (CS.2) in the Complementary Slackness Theorem, if i (p) 6 = 0 then P jk A ijk = d i : Thus,
Since p 2 P ; by (E.S), if (p j r jk ) > 0 then P i A ijk = q jk : If (p j r jk ) < 0 then, S jk (p j ) = f0g. Hence, since p and A are compatible,
Condition (12) holds because fj 0 2 G j q j 0 k > 0 and p j 0 r j 0 k > 0g G > k fj 2 G j p j r jk 0g: To see that, let j 2 G > k . Hence, there exists A 2 F such that A ijk > 0; which implies, since p and A are compatible, p j r jk 0: Thus, the second inclusion holds.
To prove the …rst one, assume j 2 fj 0 2 G j q j 0 k > 0 and p j 0 r j 0 k > 0g. Then, since p 2 P , by (E.S), P i A ijk = q jk : Thus, j 2 G > k : By Lemma 6, we can write the utilities of buyers and sellers as functions only of the equilibrium price vector p; namely, given p 2 P , we write for each i 2 B and each k 2 S,
The Set of Restricted Equilibrium Price Vectors
We start this subsection with an example that illustrates two important facts. First, it shows that, in contrast with the Shapley and Shubik (1972)'s assignment game and Sotomayor (2007)'s generalization, there are markets with two equilibrium price vectors p; p 0 2 P with the property that w k (p 0 ) > w k (p) for all k 2 S while u i (p 0 ) > u i (p) for some i 2 B (the equivalence between statements (b) and (c) at the beginning of Section 5 does not hold on P ). Second, it also shows that the (incomplete) binary relation on the set of vectors in R n + is not imbedded into the set of attainable equilibrium utilities (the equivalence between statements (a) and (b) at the beginning of Section 5 does not hold on P ). These two facts will have consequences for the lattice structures of the set(s) of (restricted) equilibrium price vectors and the sets of attainable equilibrium utilities that will be analyzed at the end of this subsection. 10 but p = (7; 2; p 3 ) < (7; 2; p 0 3 ) = p 0 : This is because no unit of good 3 is exchanged in any equilibria and hence, the equilibrium price vector p = (7; 2; p 3 ) is equivalent (in terms of its induced demands and supplies) to the equilibrium price vector p 0 = (7; 2; p 0
3 ) as long as 3 p 3 < p 0 3 10:
In order to restore the interesting property that the (incomplete) binary relation on R n + reproduces itself in terms of buyers utilities (in the corresponding space) we have to eliminate an insubstantial multiplicity of equilibrium prices of the goods that are not exchanged at any equilibrium assignment. We do it by setting the prices of each nonexchanged good equal to the highest possible one (keeping the equilibrium property of the price vector). 9 Formally, given an equilibrium price vector p 2 P , de…ne p = (p j ) j2G as follows:
where p S j = sup p2P p j . 10 Proposition 5 below says that this distortion does not a¤ect the equilibrium property of the original price vector.
Proposition 5 Let M be a market and let p 2 P . Then, p 2 P .
Proof See Appendix 1 at the end of the paper Proposition 6 shows that the distortion in (15) coincides with the one produced in p by computing its associated price vector p ( (p); (p)) from its dual solution ( (p); (p)) (see (16) in Appendix 1). Proposition 6 For every p 2 P , p ( (p); (p)) = p.
Proof See Appendix 1 at the end of the paper.
Given a market M , we can de…ne the set of restricted equilibrium price vectors P as those that are obtained from equilibrium price vectors after setting the price of the goods 9 The choice of the highest price is arbitrary. The important fact is to select, for each of these goods, just one of its potentially many equilibrium prices. 10 The vector p S = (p S j ) j2G is called the sellers-optimal equilibrium price. Similarly, de…ne for each j 2 G, p B j = inf p2P p j : The vector p B = (p B j ) j2G is called the buyers-optimal equilibrium price. By Milgrom (2009), the price vectors p S and p B do exist and they are the two extreme equilibrium prices of the complete lattice (P ; ; _;^). that are not exchanged at any optimal assignment equal to their sellers-optimal equilibrium price. Namely, P = fp 2 P j p j = p S j for every j = 2 G > g:
Theorem 3 below states that the set P has a complete lattice structure with the natural order on R n + . 11 Theorem 3 The four-tuple (P ; ; _;^) is a complete lattice.
Proof
See Appendix 1 at the end of the paper.
Our objective in the remaining of this subsection is to show how the complete lattice structure with the natural order on R n + (and on P and P ) translates into the set of of agents' utilities that are attainable at equilibrium. The fact that the lattice structure of the set of equilibrium price vectors is inherited in a dual way by the sets of equilibrium utilities of buyers and sellers is an important property because it says that there is a con ‡ict of interests between the two sides of the market (and unanimity in each of the sides) with respect to two comparable equilibrium price vectors.
De…ne the partial orders u and w on P as follows: for any pair p; p 0 2 P ; Example 1 has showed that we may have p; p 0 2 P with the property that p 6 = p 0 , but u i (p) = u i (p 0 ) for all i 2 B; i.e., the binary relation u is not a partial order on P because it is not antisymmetric since p u p 0 , p 0 u p and p 6 = p 0 hold. Hence, the lattice structure of the set P with the binary relation is not inherited by the set of utilities of buyers that are attainable at equilibrium. However, next proposition says that the partial order on the set of restricted equilibrium price vectors translates into the set of utilities of the buyers that are attainable at equilibrium (i.e., the statements (a) and (b) at the beginning of Section 5 are equivalent on this subset of P ). Formally, Proof See Appendix 1 at the end of the paper.
Consider now the restriction of the partial order u on the set P and de…ne the binary operations _ u and^u on P as the binary operations on P restricted to the set P ; namely, for all p; p 0 2 P , p _ u p 0 p and p^u p 0 p:
The four-tuple (P ; u ; _ u ;^u) is a complete lattice.
Proof It follows from Theorem 3 and Proposition 7.
Next proposition shows that the con ‡ict of interests between the two sides of the market on the set of equilibrium price vectors holds partially in our general model (statement (b) in the beginning of Section 5 implies statement (c) on P ); namely, if buyers unanimously consider the equilibrium price vector p as being at least as good as equilibrium price vector price p 0 then all sellers consider p 0 as being at least as good as p (remember that Example 1 shows that the converse does not hold). (14), w k (p 0 ) w k (p). Proposition 9 states that utilities associated to the two extreme equilibrium price vectors p B and p S are extreme and opposite utilities.
Proposition 9
Let M be a market. Then, for every p 2 P ; the following properties hold.
Proof Consider any p 2 P . By their de…nitions, p B j p j p S j for all j 2 G: In particular, these inequalities hold for all j 2 G > . By Lemma 8 in Appendix 1, u i (p B ) u i (p) u i (p S ) for all i 2 B: Thus, (9.1) holds. By Proposition 8, w k (p B ) w k (p) w k (p S ) for all k 2 S. Thus, (9.2) holds.
Consider again Example 1. Take p = (3; 2; 10) and p 0 = ( 3 2 ; 3; 10) and observe that p; p 0 2 P and w 1 (p) = w 1 (p 0 ) = 4: Hence, p w p 0 , p 0 w p, and p 6 = p 0 . Thus, the binary relation w is not a partial order on P because it is not antisymmetric. Hence, the set P does not have a lattice structure with the binary relation w (and the induced binary operations _ w and^w). Observe that this is a direct consequence of the fact that in our model sellers may own units of di¤erent goods. Therefore, two unrelated equilibrium price vectors in P may give the same utility to a seller because the losses in revenues from selling one good with a lower price are compensated with the gains from selling another good with a higher price. Obviously, this can not occur whenever each seller only owns units of a unique good, as in Sotomayor (2007 and ).
Concluding Remarks
Before …nishing the paper some remarks are in order. The …rst one is related with the computational advantage of the linear programming approach. It allows to …nd the (essentially) unique optimal assignment A as the (essentially) unique solution of the (PLP) as well as the set of equilibrium price vectors as solutions of the (DLP). Moreover, and following Leonard (1983) , there is an alternative way to compute the two extreme equilibrium price vectors p Second, the classical approach in matching of transforming many-to-many or many-toone ordinal problems into a one-to-one matching problem by breaking each buyer i and each seller k into as many pieces as his capacity constraint (d i and P j q jk , respectively) would not work here because in the one-to-one setting two units held by two di¤erent "pieces"of a seller would have to be considered as di¤erent goods and hence, they could have di¤erent prices.
Finally, we leave for future research the study of alternative cooperative notions like pairwise stability, core, or set-wise stability of the natural TU-game associated to our market and the analysis of their relationships with the set of competitive equilibria (Camiña (2006) and Sotomayor (2002 Sotomayor ( , 2007 Sotomayor ( , and 2009 ) perform parts of this analysis in their respective settings). We conjecture that the core and the set-wise stable set are non-empty, they are di¤erent sets, and the set of utilities attainable at equilibrium is a strict subset of the set of set-wise stable utilities. We also leave for future research the characterization of (strategic) equilibria when sellers (or buyers) set prices simultaneously and the relationship of these sets with the set of competitive equilibrium prices of a market M . f jk + r jk g:
Observe that when computing the minimum among all sellers, we have to exclude those that do not have good j; otherwise, the price of good j would be equal to 0 since, by assumption (1), if q jk = 0 then r jk = 0; and by (8) , jk = 0: Moreover, we de…ne p ( ; ) j to be the minimum because, even if q jk > 0, we may have that A ijk = 0 for all i 2 B in all optimal assignments A 2 F ; for instance, if r jk > v ij for all i 2 B.
Theorem 1 For every market M , P 6 = ?.
Proof Let A 2 F and ( ; ) 2 D be solutions of the (PLP) and (DLP), respectively. By Propositions 1 and 2, they exist. To show that P 6 = ;, we will show that (p ( ; ) ; A ) is an equilibrium of M . We …rst show that for all i 2 B, A (i) 2 D i (p ( ; ) ):
Fix i 2 B. Since A is feasible, (D.a) and (D.b) hold. Before proceeding, observe that by restriction (D.1) in the (DLP), for all (j 0 ; k 0 ) 2 G S,
To show that (D.c) holds assume that P jk A ijk < d i . By (CS.2) of the Complementary Slackness Theorem,
By (16) and (17),
for all j 2 G. Hence, r > i (p ( ; ) ) = ;: To show that (D.d) holds, …x j 2 G and assume that P k A ijk > 0. We want to show that j 2 r i (p ( ; ) ): By assumption, there exists k 0 2 S such that A ijk 0 > 0: Thus, q jk 0 > 0. By (CS.1) of the Complementary Slackness Theorem, i + jk 0 = ijk 0 = v ij r jk 0 . Thus, i = v ij ( jk 0 + r jk 0 ). Hence, i v ij min fk2Sjq jk >0g f jk + r jk g: By (17), i = v ij min fk2Sjq jk >0g f jk + r jk g: By (16),
for all j 0 2 G. By restriction (D.2) in the (DLP), i 0: Hence, j 2 r i (p ( ; ) ):
To show that (E.S) holds …x (j; k) 2 G S. We want to show that
). Assume …rst that P i A ijk < q jk . Then, by (CS.2) in the Complementary Slackness Theorem, jk = 0. Since, by de…nition, p ( ; ) j = min fk 0 2Sjq jk 0 >0g f jk 0 + r jk 0 g; p j jk 0 + r jk 0 for all k 0 such that q jk 0 > 0: But since 0 P i A ijk < q jk and jk = 0, p
). If p ( ; ) j = r jk then (E.S) holds trivially since P i A ijk 2 f0; :::; q jk g: Assume p ( ; ) j < r jk : By (1), q jk > 0. To get a contradiction, assume there exists i 2 B such that A ijk > 0. By (CS.1) of the Complementary Slackness Theorem, and since, by (3), ijk = v ij r jk , i + jk = ijk = v ij r jk . By hypothesis, and since by restriction (D.3) of the (DLP), jk 0;
; contradicting condition (17). Thus, for all i 2 B; A ijk = 0: Hence,
The proof of Theorem 1 (which proves that P is non-empty by showing that for all ( ; ) 2 D , p ( ; ) 2 P ) implies the following corollary.
Theorem 2 Let M be a market and let p 2 R n + be a price vector. The following two statements hold. Proof The statements of Theorem 2 will follow from Lemmata 2, 3, 4, and 5 below. We start by stating and proving a lemma that will be used in the proofs of Lemmata 4 and 5.
Lemma 1 Assume ( (p); (p)) 2 D and A 2 F . Then, p and A are compatible.
Proof of Lemma 1 Assume p 2 R n + is such that ( (p); (p)) 2 D and A 2 F . To show that p and A are compatible, we …rst show that for all i 2 B, A(i) 2 D i (p): Since A is feasible, (D.a) and (D.b) hold. To show that (D.c) holds, assume r > i (p) 6 = ;: Then, v ij p j > 0 for some j 2 G. By de…nition, i (p) > 0: By condition (CS.2) in the Complementary Slackness Theorem, P jk A ijk = d i ; namely, condition (D.c) in the de…nition of D i (p) holds.
To show that (D.d) holds, …x (i; j) 2 B G and assume P k A ijk > 0: We want to show that j 2 r i (p): Since P k A ijk > 0, there exists a seller k 2 S such that A ijk > 0. Thus, q jk > 0 holds. Moreover, by condition (CS.1) in the Complementary Slackness Theorem, i (p) + jk (p) = ijk . Since, by (3), q jk > 0 implies ijk = v ij r jk ; we have
We distinguish between the following two cases.
Case 1: p j r jk 0: Then, jk (p) = p j r jk 0: By (20), i (p) = v ij p j : If i (p) = v ij p j > 0 then j 2 r > i (p): By (7), j 2 r i (p): If i (p) = v ij p j = 0 then r > i (p) = ;: Hence, for all (j 0 ; k 0 ) 2 G S, 0 v ij 0 p j 0 . Thus, j 2 r i (p):
Case 2: p j r jk < 0: Then, jk (p) = 0: By (20), i (p) + r jk = v ij : Hence, i (p) + p j < v ij : Thus, i (p) < v ij p j : Hence, by de…nition of i (p), there exists j 0 2 r > i (p) such that i (p) = v ij 0 p j 0 < v ij p j , but this is impossible (i.e., Case 2 never occurs).
Hence, condition (D.d) holds for i 2 B. Thus, A(i) 2 D i (p) for all i 2 B. We want to show now that, for all (j; k) 2 G S,
Assume p j = r jk : Then, P i A ijk 2 S jk (p j ) holds trivially. Assume p j > r jk : Then, jk (p) = p j r jk > 0: By condition (CS.3) in the Complementary Slackness Theorem, P i A ijk = q jk : Thus, P i A ijk 2 S jk (p j ) = fq jk g: Finally, assume p j < r jk: . Then, jk (p) = 0 and S jk (p j ) = f0g: Suppose A ijk > 0: Then, q jk > 0: By condition (CS.1) in the Complementary Slackness Theorem, i (p) + jk (p) = ijk = v ij r jk 0: Since p j < r jk ; v ij p j > v ij r jk = i (p) 0; a contradiction with the de…nition of i (p): Thus, for all i 2 B, A ijk = 0 and P i A ijk = 0 2 S jk (p jk ) = f0g.
Lemma 2 [(= of (2.1)] Assume p 2 P and A 2 F are compatible. Then, A 2 F .
Proof of Lemma 2 Let p 2 P and A 2 F be compatible. We show that A 2 F in two steps. We …rst show in Claim 1 that ( (p); (p)) 2 D. Then, we show in Claim 2 that T (A) = T d ( (p); (p)), and hence, by the Strong Duality Theorem, A is a solution of the (PLP). Assume now i (p) > 0. Then, there exists j 2 r > i (p) such that i (p) = v ij p j > 0: By de…nition of r > i (p); for all
ij 0 k 0 holds as well. Thus, for all (i; j 0 ; k 0 ) 2 B G S, i (p) + j 0 k 0 (p) ij 0 k 0 : Hence, (21) holds as well when i (p) > 0. Thus, ( (p); (p)) 2 D. This ends the proof of Claim 1. Proof of Claim 2: By de…nition,
Condition (E.D) in the de…nition of an equilibrium price vector implies that, for every i 2 B, A(i) 2 D i (p): Fix (i; j; k) 2 B G S and assume A ijk > 0. By condition (D.d) in the de…nition of D i (p), j 2 r i (p): Observe that A ijk > 0 implies q jk > 0: Thus, by (3),
If r > i (p) 6 = ; then j 2 r i (p) implies v ij p j v ij 0 p j 0 for all j 0 2 G. Thus, j 2 r > i (p). Hence, by de…nitions of i (p) and r > i (p); and condition (23),
If r > i (p) = ; then, since j 2 r i (p), v ij p j = 0 and i (p) = 0: Hence, by (23),
Thus, i (p) + p j r jk = ijk : Hence, for all (i; j; k) 2 B G S such that A ijk > 0,
Thus,
Fix i 2 B. By condition (D.c) in the de…nition of D i (p); if P jk A ijk < d i then r > i (p) = ;, and by the de…nition of i (p) ; i (p) = 0. Hence, by (24),
Condition (E.S) in the de…nition of an equilibrium price vector implies that, for every (j; k) 2 G S;
To show that, for all (j; k) 2 G S,
holds, we distinguish among several cases.
Case 1: q jk = 0. Then, by supply feasibility, P i A ijk = 0. Thus, (26) holds. Case 2: q jk > 0. Proof of Lemma 5 Let p 2 R n + be such that ( (p); (p)) 2 D . We want to show that p is an equilibrium price vector of M . Let A 2 F be arbitrary. By Lemma 1, p and A are compatible. Hence, by de…nition, p 2 P . Theorem 2 holds since condition (2.1) follows from Lemmata 2 and 4, and condition (2.2) follows from Lemmata 3 and 5.
Proof Let A 2 F be an optimal assignment of M . We will prove that (p; A) is a competitive equilibrium of M by showing that conditions (E.D) and (E.S) of De…nition 3 are satis…ed by p with respect to A:
To show that condition (D.c) holds, assume r > i (p) 6 = ;. Then, there exists j 2 r > i (p) such that v ij p j > 0. Since either p j = p j or p j = p S j we have that either 0 < v ij p j = v ij p j or 0 < v ij p j = v ij p S j , which implies that either r > i (p) 6 = ; or r > i (p S ) 6 = ;. Since p and p S are both compatible with A, P jk A ijk = d i : Thus condition (D.c) holds for p.
To show that condition (D.d) holds, let (i; j) 2 B G be such that P k A ijk > 0: Thus, j 2 G > : We have to show that j 2 r i (p): Since p and p S are both compatible with A, j 2 r i (p) \ r i (p S ): By de…nition of r i (p), v ij p j 0
and v ij p j v ij 0 p j 0 for every j 0 2 G:
Since j 2 G > ; p j = p j : Thus, by (27), v ij p j 0: We distinguish between the following two cases.
Hence, v ij p j v ij 0 p j 0 for every j 0 2 G > :
Hence, v ij p j v ij 0 p j 0 for every j 0 = 2 G > : Thus, j 2 r i (p):
(E.S) For every j 2 G, P i A ijk 2 S jk (p j ): Assume …rst that j 2 G > : Then, p j = p j and S jk (p j ) = S jk (p j ). Since p and A are compatible, P i A ijk 2 S jk (p j ): Thus,
: Assume now that j = 2 G > : Then, p j = p S j and S jk (p j ) = S jk (p S j ). Since p S and A are compatible,
: Proposition 6 For every p 2 P , p ( (p); (p)) = p.
Proof Let p 2 P be given and let A 2 F be any compatible assignment. By de…nition, for all j 2 G,p j p ( (p); (p)) j = min fk2Kjq jk >0g f jk (p) + r jk g: Assume …rst that j = 2 G > . Then, P ik A ijk = 0: By (CS.2) of the Complementary Slackness Theorem, jk = 0 for all k 2 S and all jk such that there exists with the property that ( ; ) 2 D . Thus, by part (2.2) of Theorem 2, jk (p) = 0: Hence,p j = min fk2Kjq jk >0g r jk : By Corollary 2 and de…nition of p S ,p j p S j . To obtain a contradiction, assumep j < p S j . Then, there exists k 2 K such that q jk > 0 and r jk < p S j . Since, by Milgrom (2009), P is a complete lattice, p S 2 P , (E.S) implies that P i A ijk = q jk > 0; a contradiction.
Assume now that j 2 G > . It is immediate to see that, for all p 0 2 P ;
holds. Next, we show that the following claim holds.
Claim Let p 0 2 P and (i; j) 2 B G be such that j 2 r i (p 0 ), then v ij p 0
If v ij p 0 j > 0, then j 2 r > i (p 0 ). Thus, i (p 0 ) = v ij p 0 j : By restriction (D.1) of the (DLP), for all ( ; ) 2 D and all (i; j; k) 2 B G S, i + jk ijk . Thus, by (3), for all i 2 B and all (j; k) such that q jk > 0; i + jk v ij r jk : Hence,
Since j 2 G > ; condition (29) implies that there exist (i 0 ; k 0 ) 2 B S such that q jk 0 > 0; A i 0 jk 0 > 0 and j 2 r i (p 0 ). Thus, by (30) applied to ( (p 0 ); (p 0 )) and i 0 2 B, jk (p 0 ) + r jk v i 0 j i 0 (p 0 ) for all k 2 S such that q jk > 0. By the claim above, jk (p 0 )+r jk v i 0 j i 0 (p 0 ) = p 0 j : Thus, min
Moreover, by (CS.1) of the Complementary Slackness Theorem, i 0 (p 0 ) + jk 0 (p 0 ) = i 0 jk 0 = v i 0 j r jk 0 : Thus, jk 0 (p 0 ) + r jk 0 = v i 0 j i 0 (p 0 ); and by the claim above, jk 0 (p 0 ) + r jk 0 = v i 0 j i 0 (p 0 ) = p 0 j : Thus, by (31), min fk2Kjq jk >0g f jk (p 0 ) + r jk g = p 0 j , which implies that p 0 j = p j : Hence, p ( (p); (p)) = p: Theorem 3 The four-tuple (P ; ; _;^) is a complete lattice.
Proof
We will show that the set of restricted equilibrium price vectors P of M has the property that each of its non-empty subsets has a supremum and an in…mum according to the order . This will imply that the set P has a complete lattice structure. Let Z P be a non-empty subset of restricted equilibrium price vectors of M . De…ne the price vector p B (Z) 2 R n + by taking, for each j 2 G, the in…mum among all j components of the vectors in Z: Similarly, de…ne the price vector p S (Z) 2 R n + by taking, for each j 2 G, the supremum among all j components of the vectors in Z. Then, it turns out that p B (Z) and p S (Z) are also restricted equilibrium price vectors of M (see Lemma 7 below). Formally, given a market M , de…ne p B (Z) = (p B j (Z)) j2G 2 R n + and p S (Z) = (p S j (Z)) j2G 2 R n + as follows: for each j 2 G, let p B j (Z) = inf p2Z p j and p S j (Z) = sup p2Z p j :
For the special case where Z = P , we have written p B and p S instead of p B (P ) and p S (P ).
Lemma 7
Let M be a market. Then, p B (Z) ; p S (Z) 2 P for all ; 6 = Z P .
Proof of lemma 7 Let A 2 F be an optimal assignment of M . Given a non empty subset Z P , we will …rst prove that p To show that condition (D.c) holds, assume r > i (p S (Z)) 6 = ;. Then, there exists j 2 r > i (p S (Z)) such that v ij p S j (Z) > 0. Since p S j (Z) = sup p2Z p j ; we have that for every p 2 Z, 0 < v ij p S j (Z) v ij p j , which implies that r > i (p) 6 = ;: Because p and A are compatible, P jk A ijk = d i : Thus condition (D.c) holds for p S (Z). To show that condition (D.d) holds, let j 2 G be such that P k A ijk > 0: We have to show that j 2 r i (p S (Z)). Since for all p 2 Z, p and A are compatible, j 2 r i (p) for every p 2 Z: By de…nition of r i (p), v ij p j 0 and v ij p j v ij 0 p j 0 for every j 0 2 G.
holds for all p 2 Z. Let fp m g m2N be a sequence such that, for all m 2 N, p m 2 Z and fp m j g m2N ! sup p2Z p j : By (33), v ij 0 p m j 0 v ij 0 sup p2Z p j 0 for all m 2 N. Since j 2 r i (p) for every p 2 Z; j 2 r i (p m ) for every m 2 N. Thus, v ij p m j v ij 0 p m j 0 for all m 2 N. Thus, v ij p m j v ij 0 sup p2Z p j 0 for all m 2 N. Hence, v ij sup p2Z p j v ij 0 sup p2Z p j 0 : Thus, j 2 r i (p S (Z)):
(E.S) for p S (Z): For every (j; k) 2 G S, P i A ijk 2 S jk (p S j (Z)): Fix (j; k) 2 G S. If p S j (Z) < r jk then, for all p 2 Z, p j p S j (Z) < r jk . Thus, P i A ijk = 0 2 S jk (p j ): Thus, P i A ijk 2 f0g = S jk (p S j (Z)): If p S j (Z) > r jk ; let fp m g m2N be a sequence such that, for all m 2 N, p m 2 Z and fp m j g m2N ! sup p2Z p j : Then, there exists m 2 N such that for all m > m; p m j > r jk . Thus,
Since A is feasible, conditions (D.a) and (D.b) hold.
To show that condition (D.c) holds, assume r > i (p B (Z)) 6 = ;: Then, there exists j 2 r > i (p B (Z)) such that v ij p B j (Z) > 0. Let fp m g m2N be a sequence such that, for all m 2 N, p m 2 Z and fp m j g m2N ! inf p2Z p j : Then, there exist m 2 N such that, for all m > m; v ij p m j > 0, which implies that r > i (p m ) 6 = ;: Because p m and A are compatible, P jk A ijk = d i : Thus, condition (D.c) holds for p B (Z).
To show that condition (D.d) holds, let j 2 G be such that P k A ijk > 0: We have to show that j 2 r i (p B (Z)): Since for all p 2 Z, p and A are compatible, j 2 r i (p) for every p 2 Z: By de…nition of r i (p), v ij p j 0 and v ij p j v ij 0 p j 0 for every j 0 2 G. By de…nition of p B (Z) ; v ij p B j (Z) = v ij inf p2Z p j v ij p j for all p 2 Z: Fix j 0 2 G and let fp m g m2N be a sequence such that, for all m 2 N, p m 2 Z and fp m j 0 g m2N ! inf p2Z p j 0 : Then, by de…nition of p B j (Z), v ij p B j (Z) v ij 0 p m j 0 for every m 2 N: Since j 2 r i (p m ), v ij p m j v ij 0 p m j 0 for every m 2 N. Thus, v ij p B j (Z) v ij 0 p m j 0 for every m 2 N:
Since this holds for all j 0 2 G, j 2 r i (p B (Z)): (E.S) for p B (Z): For every (j; k) 2 G S, P i A ijk 2 S jk (p B j (Z)): Fix (j; k) 2 G S. If p B j (Z) > r jk then, p j > r jk for all p 2 Z. Thus, P i A ijk = q jk 2 fq jk g = S jk (p j ): Thus, P i A ijk 2 S jk (p B j (Z)): If p S j < r jk ; let fp m g m2N be a sequence such that, for all m 2 N, p m 2 Z and fp m j g m2N ! inf p2Z p j : Then, there exists m 2 N such that for all m > m; p m j < r jk . Thus, P i A ijk 2 f0g = S jk (p m j ) for all m > m: Hence, P i A ijk 2 f0g = S jk (p B j (Z)): We now prove that indeed p B (Z); p S (Z) 2 P : That is, that p B j (Z) = p S j and p S j (Z) = p S j for every j = 2 G > . Let j = 2 G > : Since p B j (Z) = inf p2Z p j and p 2 Z P implies p j = p S j ; inf p2Z p j = p S j : Thus, p B j (Z) = p S j : Hence, p B (Z) 2 P : Similarly, p S (Z) 2 P : By Lemma 7 above we can write for each ; 6 = Z P and j 2 G, p S j (Z) = max p2Z p j and p B j (Z) = min p2Z p j . In particular, p S j (P ) = max p2P p j for all j 2 G and p B j (P ) = min p2P p j for all j 2 G > and p B j = p S j for all j = 2 G > : To show that (P ; ; _;^) is a lattice let p; p 0 2 P and set Z = fp; p 0 g: Then, p _ p 0 = p S (Z) and p^p 0 = p B (Z): By Lemma 7, p _ p 0 2 P and p^p 0 2 P . Moreover, it is immediate to check that _ and^are idempotent, commutative, associative, and absorbing binary operations on P . Thus, (P ; ; _;^) is a lattice. To prove that it is complete, consider any ; 6 = Z P . By de…nition, lub Z = p S (Z) and llb Z = p B (Z). By Lemma 7, p S (Z); p B (Z) 2 P . Thus, (P ; ; _;^) is a complete lattice. 
Fix i 2 B and assume r > i (p 0 ) 6 = ;: Then, there exists j 0 2 G > such that v ij 0 p 0 j 0 > 0: By (37), v ij 0 p j 0 > 0; which implies that r > i (p) 6 = ;: Hence, if r > i (p 0 ) 6 = ; there exists j 0 2 G > such that
Thus, by (13) , u i (p) u i (p 0 ). Assume now that r > i (p 0 ) = ;: Then, since by de…nition 0 i (p); i (p 0 ) = 0 i (p): Hence, by (13) , u i (p) u i (p 0 ). Thus, for every i 2 B, u i (p) u i (p 0 ). :
De…nition The matrix X is totally unimodular if the determinants of all its square submatrices are equal to either 1; 0; or 1:
Theorem (Schrijver, 1996) If X is totally unimodular then, for every integer vector b, the vertices of the polyhedral (the intersections of a …nite number of half-spaces)
fA : X A bg have all integer coordinates.
Theorem (Schrijver, 1996) A matrix X = (x ij ) j=1;:::;m i=1;:::;n is totally unimodular if: (1) x ij 2 f 1; 0; 1g for all 1 i n and all 1 j m:
(2) Each column has at most two nonzero coe¢ cients; namely, n P i=1 jx ij j 2:
(3) Let R = f1; :::; ng be the set of raws; then, there exists a partition fR 1 ; R 2 g of R such that, for each column j 2 f1; :::; mg that has two non-zero coe¢ cients,
It is easy to check that the matrix X of any market satis…es conditions (1), (2), and (3) in the above theorem. Hence, X is totally unimodular and thus, the (PLP) has at least a solution with all integer components. That X satis…es (1) and (2) is immediate. To illustrate (3), consider again the case jBj = jGj = jSj = 2: Then, R = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6g and R 1 = f1; 2g and R 2 = f3; 4; 5; 6g; that is, _ and^are de…ned). 12 We use this second approach to show in Theorem 3 that the set P has a lattice structure with the following natural join and meet. Let p; p 0 2 P : De…ne p _ p 0 p = ( p j ) j2G and p^p 0 p = (p j ) j2G as follows. For each j 2 G, p j = maxfp j ; p 0 j g andp j = minfp j ; p 0 j g:
